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“THE MAGICAL SCENT OF THE SAVAGE”: 
COLONIAL VIOLENCE, THE CRISIS OF 
CIVILIZATION, AND THE ORIGINS OF THE 
LEGALIST PARADIGM OF WAR 
Devin O. Pendas*
Abstract: Since the beginning of time, war has been accompanied by 
atrocity. While there were attempts to regulate such violence, for most 
of history the penchant toward deliberate atrocity was largely viewed 
as a political or military problem. During World War II, however, the 
Allies declared that wartime atrocity was not only morally reprehensi-
ble, but also legally actionable and this declaration represented the 
triumph of a new paradigm for how to think about the conduct of 
war, the “legalist paradigm.” This Article describes the emergence of 
the legalist paradigm and argues that the emergence of the legalist 
paradigm of war was a response to the breakdown of a long-standing 
civilizational consensus among European Elites. 
Introduction 
 Since time immemorial, war has been accompanied by atrocity, 
that is, mass violence directed at non-combatants or at prisoners of war. 
One need only recall Tacitus’s description of the Roman way of war in 
Britain— “[t]o robbery, slaughter, plunder, they give the lying name of 
empire; they make a solitude and call it peace” —or the Roman treat-
ment of the Carthaginians in the wake of the Third Punic War (literally 
salting the earth) to recognize this.1 While there were attempts, 
through customary law or, later, through formal law, to regulate this 
violence, this inclination towards deliberate atrocity was largely viewed 
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for most of history as primarily a political or military problem, one 
ªrmly under the jurisdiction of politicians, diplomats, or generals.2 Yet 
this is precisely what changed beginning in the second half of World 
War II. Starting in the fall of 1943, with the founding of the United Na-
tions War Crimes Commission (UNWCC) and with the Moscow Decla-
ration, condemning Axis atrocities and promising legal retribution, the 
Allies declared their intention to pursue a legal as well as a political and 
military strategy for managing the end of the war.3 Henceforth, war-
time atrocity was, in principle at least, legally actionable, not merely 
morally reprehensible. This declaration that justice, as much as peace 
or renewed international stability, would be an essential goal of postwar 
policy represents something new in the history of the world. Indeed, it 
represented the triumph of a new paradigm for how to think about the 
conduct of war, one that could be termed, to borrow a phrase from Mi-
chael Walzer, the “legalist paradigm.”4
I. Background 
 The legalist paradigm of war, as I am using the term, has two cen-
tral aspects: ªrst, it asserts the possibility of state criminality, that state 
actions can, regardless of the doctrine of state sovereignty, be criminal 
actions; second, it asserts individual culpability, that state criminality 
does not excuse individual actors for their culpable actions in state 
sponsored crimes. This deªnition expands on Walzer’s, which refers 
exclusively to state criminality and is limited to the question of aggres-
sion.5 By its very nature, Walzer’s deªnition thus tends to exclude in-
dividual criminality. (No individual ever invaded a neighboring coun-
try on his or her own.) This seems to me to be too narrow a reading 
of the paradigm that emerged from World War II. While it is true that 
crimes against peace, i.e., aggression, were the centerpiece of the 
prosecution’s case at Nuremberg, it is this area of the international 
criminal law of armed conºict that has been least developed subse-
quently. Rather, it is the notion that individuals, acting as state agents, 
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2007] Origins of the Legalist Paradigm of War 31 
can and should be held criminally liable for speciªc atrocities, that 
has come to dominate the legalist paradigm. In this respect, there is a 
mutual entanglement of individual and state criminality. The system-
atic character of these crimes in general requires state—or quasi-state 
(e.g., separatist guerillas)—sponsorship, but it is individuals, not col-
lectivities, who are held culpable and punished. 
A. The Beginnings of the Law of War 
 It would overstate the case to say that it had never occurred to any-
one that wartime atrocities might be legally actionable prior to 1943. 
There were precedents. The Romans considered the declaration of war, 
though not its conduct, to be a matter for the jus gentium, the law of na-
tions. Formal laws of war, in the form of Royal ordinances, date back to 
the Middle Ages, and oral customary law concerning proper conduct in 
wartime dates back even further.6 Thus, in the ªrst known war crimes 
trial in 1305, the English executed Sir William Wallace (of Braveheart 
fame) “for waging a war of extermination against the English popula-
tion, ‘sparing neither age nor sex, monk nor nun.’”7 Nevertheless, as 
this case itself illustrates, enforcement in this period was sporadic, highly 
politicized—it was more a trial for treason than it was for war crimes— 
and liable to qualify by today’s standards as criminal itself (in this case 
torture without any protection of due process). 
 Above all, regulating military conduct was either ad hoc, through 
Royal ordinances issued for speciªc campaigns, or customary and 
largely unenforceable, as in the heraldic jus armorum, the law of warri-
ors. In either case, its promulgation and enforcement was national (or 
occasionally bilateral), rather than international in scope.8 Most impor-
tantly, the legal regulation of military violence was in this period seen as 
at best a secondary issue, an option that could be pursued according to 
the moral or religious predilections of various actors, but which was not 
established as a general principle that pertained in all conºicts. 
 In the early modern period, several authors, Hugo Grotius ªrst 
and foremost, began to articulate a doctrine of natural rights that was 
not restricted by considerations of sovereignty or domestic jurisdiction, 
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thus justifying what amounted to armed humanitarian intervention.9 
Grotius, for instance, wrote: 
It is proper also to observe that kings and those who are pos-
sessed of sovereign power have a right to exact punishment 
not only for injuries affecting immediately themselves or 
their own subjects, but for gross violations of the law of na-
tion and of nations, done to other states and subjects.10
Some crimes, he argued, are crimes regardless of the sovereignty of 
those committing them, on the basis of a natural, and hence interna-
tional, sense of law. Grotius also argued that it was possible to conduct 
war in a moderate and humane manner and therefore, since such 
conduct was in principle possible, it could be legally required.11 This 
meant that the speciªc conduct of war could, in principle, be legis-
lated. This was an important theoretical advance over the ad hoc do-
mestic jurisdiction of earlier royal ordinances. 
 Yet, as Richard Tuck has argued, Grotius’ thought concerning 
rights was “Janus-faced . . . its two mouths speak the languages of both 
absolutism and liberty.”12 For instance, like most early modern theo-
rists, Grotius defended slavery based on a doctrine of sovereignty. 
Under the proper circumstances, a person could cede rights to a sov-
ereign, including the right to one’s own liberty and that of one’s 
progeny. Consequently, while sovereignty did not constitute the abso-
lute boundary of legality, neither could its requirements be entirely 
subsumed under general legal principles. Indeed, in his defense of 
humanitarian intervention, Grotius continues: 
[F]or the liberty of inºicting punishment for the peace and 
welfare of society, which belonged to individuals in the early 
ages of the world, was converted into the judicial authority 
of sovereign states and princes; a right devolving upon them 
not only as rulers of others, but as subject to the controul 
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[sic] of no earthly power. For that is a right which can be-
long to no subject.13
Sovereignty thus both enabled and limited the demands that justice 
could impose upon monarchs and their soldiers. 
 The very nature of war itself imposed further restrictions upon 
humanitarian principles in this context. “In war things which are nec-
essary to attain the end in view are permissible.”14 The most obvious 
necessary thing in war is of course killing, which ought to be limited 
but cannot be avoided. “Though there may be circumstances, in which 
absolute justice will not condemn the sacriªce of lives in war, yet hu-
manity will require that the greatest precaution should be used 
against involving the innocent in danger, except in case of extreme 
urgency and utility.”15 Note that here as elsewhere, Grotius’ humani-
tarianism is bounded strictly by principles of utility. Innocents ought 
not be harmed unless it is urgent and useful to do so. As Peter Hag-
genmacher pointed out, for Grotius, a belligerent in a “just war” is 
permitted everything that is necessary to achieve the ends of that war, 
namely, the restitution of his violated rights, though no more.16
 In the end, even Grotius acceded to some degree to a European 
military realpolitik, one in which the logic of violence trumped the 
logic of law, and which governed the conduct and practice of war to a 
far greater extent than did any legal considerations. This position 
culminated in Carl von Clausewitz’s coldly logical conclusion that: 
Kind-hearted people might of course think that there was 
some ingenious way to disarm or defeat an enemy without 
too much bloodshed, and might imagine this is the true goal 
of the art of war. Pleasant as it sounds, this is a fallacy that 
must be exposed: war is such a dangerous business that the 
mistakes which come from kindness are the very worst. . . . 
War is an act of force, and there is no logical limit to the ap-
plication of that force. Each side, therefore, compels its op-
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ponent to follow suit; a reciprocal action is started which 
must lead, in theory, to extremes.17
For Clausewitz, as for most military practitioners, the logic of military 
violence of necessity exceeded the capacity of law to regulate it. To 
think otherwise, he asserted, was both hopeless and dangerously na-
ïve.18 Any observable moderation of military violence between “civi-
lized” peoples was simply the result of the “social conditions of the 
states themselves and in their relationships to one another.”19
 In other words, if civilized nations refrained from inºicting upon 
one another the worst that war had to offer, this reºected the nature 
of civilization, not of war; nor could it be dictated as a matter of delib-
erate policy but was only a spontaneous result of the social condition 
of civilization: 
Savage peoples are ruled by passion, civilized peoples by the 
mind. The difference, however, lies not in the respective na-
tures of savagery and civilization, but in their attendant cir-
cumstances, institutions, and so forth. The difference, there-
fore, does not operate in every case, but it does in most of 
them. Even the most civilized of peoples, in short, can be ªred 
with passionate hatred for each other.20
Clausewitz’s prescient implication, then, was that a change in these so-
cial circumstances could well lead to a barbarization of warfare, even 
among civilized peoples. 
B. Toward Formal Codiªcation 
 Beginning in the mid-nineteenth century, there was a movement 
towards the formal codiªcation of what had been a largely informal, 
ad hoc customary law of war, beginning with Francis Lieber’s Instruc-
tions for the Government Armies of the United States in the Field, the famous 
General Orders No. 100 of 1863.21 Lieber’s code added little that was 
new to the customary laws of war, and indeed, perhaps because of 
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Lieber’s own background as a soldier in Blucher’s army ªghting 
against Napoleon, even evinces some of Clausewitz’s cold logic of 
military extremism, justifying both the granting of no quarter when 
militarily necessary and military reprisals under certain circum-
stances.22 Still, the recognition that customary law alone was in-
sufªcient protection against military atrocity, and that some form of 
codiªed law was necessary, marks a decisive precedent for the emer-
gence of the legalist paradigm of war. 
 This development toward formal codiªcation continued with the 
Hague Conventions on the Laws and Customs of War of 1899 and 
1907.23 These were important developments, to be sure, beginning a 
process of bringing the laws of war into line with the increasingly 
formal, stipulative character of domestic law in this same period. Al-
though they relied heavily on Lieber’s code, the Hague Conventions 
were more stringent in their prohibition against giving no quarter, 
and prohibited, among other things, the bombardment of towns or 
other civilian habitations, the pillage of occupied territories, and the 
maltreatment of prisoners. In a real sense, the history of the modern 
laws of war begins with these Conventions, and they continue to sup-
ply much of the vocabulary of the international laws of war. As Telford 
Taylor has noted, “in all of these treaties, the laws of war are stated as 
general principles of conduct, and neither the means of enforcement 
nor the penalties for violation are speciªed.”24 Taylor slightly over-
states the case, as Article 3 of the 1907 Hague Convention does stipu-
late that “a belligerent party which violates the provisions of the said 
Regulations shall, if the case demands, be liable to pay compensation. 
It shall be responsible for all acts committed by persons forming part 
                                                                                                                      
22 Lieber wrote: 
It is against the usage of modern war to resolve, in hatred and revenge, to 
give no quarter. No body of troops has the right to declare that it will not give, 
and therefore will not expect, quarter; but a commander is permitted to di-
rect his troops to give no quarter, in great straits, when his own salvation 
makes it impossible to cumber himself with prisoners. 
Meron, supra note 2, at 134. Similarly, “Quarter having been given to an enemy by Ameri-
can troops, under a misapprehension of his true character, he may, nevertheless, be or-
dered to suffer death if, within three days after the battle, it be discovered that he belongs 
to a corps which gives no quarter.” Id. at 135. 
23 See Documents on the Laws of War 59–138 (Adam Roberts & Richard Guelff eds., 
2000) (for excerpts). See generally Dorothy V. Jones, Toward a Just World: The Criti-
cal Years in the Search for International Justice 6–8 (2002). 
24 Taylor, supra note 21, at 50. 
36 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 30:29 
of its armed forces.”25 Nonetheless, the fact that the stipulated penal-
ties are restricted to reparations indicates the extent to which the 
Hague Conventions were still working within an essentially political 
understanding of military atrocity. Indeed, one might go further and 
argue that the Hague Conventions conceptualized military atrocity as 
essentially a civil law violation of the implicit contract of civilization 
itself and thus subject to compensatory, but not penal, sanctions. This 
would make their use of reparations as a sanction symptomatic of a 
civilizational model of international law itself, one based on a largely 
tacit, but nonetheless powerful, sense of shared normative consensus. 
 Furthermore, the assertion that states are responsible for the ac-
tions of their military personnel in the Hague Conventions stops well 
short of a doctrine of state criminality, as there is no indication that the 
state itself could be a criminal actor.26 There remains a substantial gap 
between individual atrocity and state liability in the Hague Conven-
tions. A fully legalist paradigm of mass atrocity and war crimes, one that 
stipulates the criminal, as opposed to political, liability for war crimes of 
both individuals and states is at most still inchoate. 
 The primacy of sovereignty can again be seen in the ªrst rudi-
mentary efforts at a systematic prosecution of military atrocity in the 
wake of World War I.27 Under pressure from British Prime Minister 
David Lloyd George, who had pledged in the elections of 1918 to 
“hang the Kaiser,” Article 28 of the Versailles Treaty declared that Al-
lies had the right to try Germans for violations of the laws and cus-
toms of war.28 In fact, however, no such tribunals were ever convened. 
Indeed, there was a fundamental conºict between the British, who 
favored the creation of an international tribunal after the war, and the 
Americans, who did not.29 In 1919, American representatives to the 
Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on 
Enforcement of Penalties argued that they were unaware of any “in-
ternational statute or convention making the a violation of the laws 
                                                                                                                      
25 Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 
1907, 36 Stat. 2277 [hereinafter Hague Convention], reprinted in Documents on the Laws 
of War, supra note 23, at 70. 
26 See generally Pieter N. Drost, The Crime of State: Penal Protection for Fun-
damental Freedoms of Persons and Peoples (1959). 
27 See generally Gerd Hankel, Die Leipziger Prozesse: Deutsche Kriegsverbrechen 
und ihre strafrechtliche Verfolgung nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg (2003); James F. 
Willis, Prologue to Nuremberg: The Politics and Diplomacy of Punishing War 
Criminals of the First World War (1982). 
28 Willis, supra note 27, at 49, 177. 
29 Kochavi, supra note 3, at 2. 
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and customs of war—not to speak of the laws or principles of human-
ity—an international crime, afªxing a punishment to it, and declaring 
the court which has jurisdiction over the offense.”30 Thus, although 
the Allies delivered a list of 845 suspects to the Germans in February 
1920 whom they wanted turned over for trial, the conditions were al-
ready in place for Allied capitulation to German pressure to abandon 
international trials. Instead, they allowed the Germans to stage their 
own trials of a mere forty-ªve suspects.31
 The principle of sovereignty won out even in the case of a de-
feated and, at the time, widely detested power, one against whom alle-
gations of war crimes, although treated skeptically for much of the 
past eighty years, have turned out to be more true than many have 
assumed.32 With great reluctance and typical respect for matters of 
military policy, the Germans opened their trials under the jurisdiction 
of the German Supreme Court in Leipzig in the spring of 1921. The 
trials proved to be a ªasco. Only a handful of the accused were con-
victed and those that were received very mild sentences (ranging from 
two to four years).33 Two of the worst offenders soon escaped prison, 
probably with police assistance, and disappeared. 
 Despite their limitations, however, the Leipzig trials, together with 
their equally problematic counterparts in Constantinople, marked an 
important step in the development of the legalist paradigm of war, in 
that they represented the ªrst serious effort to use international pres-
sure to enforce the laws of war.34 Nonetheless, the central signiªcance 
of the Leipzig trials was essentially as a negative precedent. They fully, if 
temporarily as it turned out, discredited the Hague notion that states 
could and should be allowed to prosecute their own war criminals. 
II. Emergence of the Legalist Paradigm 
 These rather unsatisfactory precedents make the emergence in the 
wake of World War II of the legalist paradigm of war even more strik-
ing. This time around, it was the Americans in particular who, in con-
trast to their position after World War I, strongly favored the applica-
tion of legal prosecutions to Nazi atrocities. Secretary of War Henry J. 
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Stimson, one of the leading American advocates of trials, wrote in his 
journal that “it is preferable to organize a major trial during which we 
can prove, in its entirety, the Nazi plot to wage a war of aggression that 
once set in motion violates all the normal rules which limit cruelty and 
unnecessary destruction.”35 The drafting of the London Charter for 
the International Military Tribunal in June 1945 thus marked a major 
turning point, one that had to overcome considerable opposition, not 
only from those, like Churchill and Stalin, who initially favored sum-
mary executions, but also from lawyers working for both the U.S. State 
Department and the British Foreign Ofªce.36 The three crimes out-
lined in the London Charter, crimes against peace, war crimes, and 
crimes against humanity, mark the ªrst full articulation of the legalist 
paradigm of war by connecting both state and individual criminality. 
 If the emergence of a full legalist paradigm in the aftermath of 
World War II thus marks a fundamental transformation of the rela-
tionship between law and war, then the question obviously arises as to 
why this shift occurred. Why did it make sense after World War II, in a 
way that it never had before, to think about the conduct of war as a 
potentially criminal enterprise, one that ought to be legally actionable 
in some manner? Why did justice, understood in legal (rather than, 
say, political or moral) terms, come to join peace or victory as an in-
creasingly common war aim? I would argue that the emergence of the 
legalist paradigm of war after 1945 was a response to the breakdown 
of a long-standing civilizational consensus among European Elites. 
A. The Civilizational Consensus 
 This civilizational consensus rested on the assumption that there 
was an intrinsic connection between the nation-state form—deªned 
legally by the doctrine of sovereignty as it emerged from 1648 on—and 
the practice and protection of “civilized” norms of both internal and 
international conduct. “Barbarism,” generally seen in at least implicitly 
racialist terms, was held to be an attribute primarily of pre-state peo-
ples, and international law was seen as pertaining to the relationships 
                                                                                                                      
35 Henri Meyrowitz, La Répression par les Tribunaux Allemands des Crimes 
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between, but not within, civilized, and hence sovereign, nation-states.37 
Henry Bonªls and Paul Fauchille argued in 1898 that international law 
“applies to relations between states which have attained this level of civi-
lization.”38 International law, including the law of war (as in the Hague 
Conventions), was not just, as the Romans had held, a jus gentium, a law 
of nations, but a law of civilized nations. This in turn delimited what it 
was that the international law of war needed to regulate: individual ex-
cesses against enemy civilians or prisoners of war, the victims presumed 
to be citizens of sovereign nation-states; and who was in charge of en-
forcement, each sovereign state being responsible for its own person-
nel. Far from there being any provision for dealing with the reciprocal 
entanglement of state and individual criminality, there was a radical 
disjuncture between the two. 
 The legalist paradigm as it emerged after World War II marks a 
clear departure from this model. In particular, in the categories of 
“crimes against peace” and “crimes against humanity,” as they emerged 
in the London Charter, the mutual implication of individual and state 
criminality is largely codiªed. But why? Why did a legalist paradigm 
emerge for responding to mass atrocity in wartime in the mid-twentieth 
century? The most obvious and common answer is that the unprece-
dented character of Nazi atrocities made anything less than an un-
precedented response seem trivial and inadequate. Geoffrey Robert-
son, for instance, has asserted that “the Holocaust was a revelation that 
. . . crystallized the Allied war aims and called forth an international 
tribunal—the court at Nuremberg—to punish individual Nazis for the 
barbarities they had authorized against German citizens.”39 This answer 
is inadequate for two reasons. 
 First, while the Holocaust was hardly ignored completely at Nur-
emberg or in the successor trials, it was hardly central either.40 In par-
ticular, the prosecution’s insistence at Nuremberg that crimes against 
peace, and not crimes against humanity, was the foundational criminal 
charge, as well as the court’s ªnding that crimes against humanity had 
to be linked to crimes against peace (thus making peacetime crimes 
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39 Geoffrey Robertson, Crimes Against Humanity: The Struggle for Global 
Justice, at xiv (1999). 
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against humanity non-actionable), marginalized the Holocaust to a sig-
niªcant degree. Second, Nazis were hardly the only ones tried under 
the new legalist paradigm of war after 1945. There were a series of trials 
conducted in East Asia as well.41 It would be a mistake to see the East 
Asian trials as a purely derivative phenomenon, particularly given the 
lasting impact of the Yamashita precedent regarding the doctrine of 
command responsibility. The legalist paradigm in 1945 was not a 
uniquely European phenomenon, and thus cannot be held to have 
originated solely in the experience of Nazi genocide. 
1. Doctrine of State Sovereignty 
 If the speciªcally unprecedented character of Nazi atrocities can-
not fully account for the emergence of the legalist paradigm, how then 
do we account for it? The answer to this question can be discerned by 
noting a particular feature of the paradigm it replaces—the doctrine of 
state sovereignty. In July 1998, when Undersecretary of State David 
Scheffer testiªed before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee con-
cerning the Statute of the International Criminal Court then being ne-
gotiated in Rome, Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC) noted, in defending his 
opposition to the ICC: 
I’ve been accused by advocates of this court of engaging in 
18th century thinking. Well, I ªnd that to be a compliment. It 
was the 18th century that gave us our Constitution and the 
fundamental protections of our Bill of Rights. I’ll gladly stand 
with James Madison and the rest of our Founding Fathers 
over that collection of ne’er-do-wells in Rome any day.42
In his inimitable fashion, what Senator Helms was arguing was that 
rights are inextricably connected with sovereignty and that the state is 
their only possible guarantor.43 At its theoretical and jurisprudential 
core, international law prior to 1945 was, as I have shown, a law of 
sovereignty. The legalist paradigm of war was a direct challenge to this 
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vision of the sovereign nation-state—even if much of this challenge 
was deºected, ªrst by the Nuremberg tribunal and subsequently by 
the United Nations in the face of the Cold War. In this respect, the 
legalist paradigm of war has to be understood as a key element in the 
broader universalizing project of international human rights. 
 The doctrine of state sovereignty, stated in its most austere form by 
Thomas Hobbes, holds that “because every subject is by this institution 
author of all the actions and judgments of the sovereign instituted; it 
follows that whatsoever he doth, it can be no injury to any of his sub-
jects; nor ought he to be by any of them accused of injustice.”44 
Though subsequent authors and legal developments, ranging from 
John Locke to the U.S. Constitution, were able to more or less success-
fully challenge the rigidity of Hobbes’s assertion that the sovereign is 
incapable, by nature, of injustice, they mostly restricted their critiques 
to domestic politics, defending a legal restriction of unbounded state 
sovereignty only within the nation. In other words, the sovereignty of 
the state could, on these accounts be limited by the citizens of that 
state, but not by outsiders. 
 The rise of a universalist human rights culture in opposition to 
strong notions of state sovereignty is in effect an attempt to replace 
norms guaranteed politically by the state with norms guaranteed le-
gally by international consensus—though still enforced, if at all, by 
third party states acting in the name of international institutions.45 As 
such, it often appears as either a utopian project for world govern-
ance in a liberal vein or, more pragmatically, as an attempt to impose 
legal norms on the state form via an international cultural consensus, 
i.e. as a form of pressure politics.46 The question then is not just why 
the state came to be seen as a threat to certain rights-based norms— 
the answer to that is all too obvious—but rather why it was ever as-
sumed otherwise. In other words, given the explicitly anomic form of 
sovereignty, why was it ever assumed that this form would not on occa-
sion acquire an anti-normative or immoral content? If many now rec-
ognize that the state form is at best morally neutral, at worst, capable 
of great evil, why was it ever assumed otherwise? 
 The explicit answer, formulated in the aftermath of the wars of 
religion, was that whatever the potential evil of the state form, it was 
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preferable to the anarchic violence ensuing from universalizing moral 
projects. That, in effect, was Hobbes’s answer. Yet this answer only ac-
quired plausibility against a background assumption that the state 
form itself would not, as a rule, act all that badly. Why not? The an-
swer is that for much of the history of the modern European nation-
state, it was taken for granted that the anomic state form was embed-
ded in a larger, transnational normative framework conceptualized 
loosely as “civilization.”47
 As deªned by J.S. Mill, civilization entailed a “multiplication of 
physical comforts; the advancement and diffusion of knowledge; the 
decay of superstition; the facilities of mutual intercourse; the softening 
of manners; the decline of war and personal conºict; the progressive 
limitation of the tyranny of the strong over the weak . . . .”48 European 
states, along with other honorary Europeans, like the United States and 
even to a degree Japan, were civilized states and could be expected to 
behave more or less accordingly, certainly vis-à-vis other civilized 
states.49 In the context of European colonialism, this civilizational con-
sensus also had a clear racial dimension to it. Yet if “civilization” was a 
code word for “white,” it was also viewed as a mode of regulating vio-
lence.50
 The state had no need to subject itself to the explicit norms of 
formal law because it was always already an institutional embodiment 
of the prior informal normative consensus of civilization. It was only 
when this assumption proved itself to be spectacularly untrue—not 
once but twice in the span of a generation—that the project of exo-
genously regulating state violence through international law could 
acquire more than utopian force. Indeed, for a time at least, it came 
to be widely perceived as a matter of life and death, both for the state 
and for civilization itself. 
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2. The Civilized Versus the Savages 
 To trace the collapse of what might be termed the “civilizational 
supposition” to the Holocaust alone would be too narrow. A doctrine 
as venerable and self-interested as state sovereignty does not succumb 
easily.51 What one must keep in mind is that the Holocaust was not an 
isolated event, however unprecedented it was; rather, it marked the 
culmination of thirty years’ crisis, involving two world wars, and un-
paralleled destruction. In particular, what was troubling to a great 
many European and American elites in the mid-twentieth century is 
that events seemed to be proving the pessimists right. Such pessimists, 
whether of the right (Oswald Spengler), the left (H.G. Wells), or the 
middle ( Joseph Conrad), had long argued that European civilization 
was fragile and that Europeans themselves were paradoxically the 
main source of the threat. German barbarism in the two world wars 
was thus a problem both because of its victims and because of its per-
petrators. That such things happened was unfortunate, but not actu-
ally that surprising. That Europeans did them to other Europeans was 
truly shocking. Civilization apparently provided an inadequate moral 
check on sovereign states, even “civilized” ones. 
 This is one of the key points in Justice Robert H. Jackson’s fa-
mous declaration, in his opening statement to the court at Nurem-
berg, that: 
[T]he wrongs which we seek to condemn and punish have 
been so calculated, so malignant, and so devastating, that civi-
lization cannot tolerate their being ignored, because it cannot 
survive their being repeated. That four great nations, ºushed 
with victory and stung with injury stay the hand of vengeance 
and voluntarily submit their captive enemies to the judgment 
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of the law is one of the most signiªcant tributes that Power 
has ever paid to Reason.52
Two things are worth noting about this statement. First, reason here is 
synonymous with law, and the argument is clearly that even state power 
is, or ought to be, subordinate to law. Second, law is placed in the ser-
vice of civilization; indeed, it serves as both its embodiment and its 
most powerful shield. 
 Even when the Holocaust was used to justify the emerging legalist 
paradigm after World War II, what was relevant was not the killing but 
the “civilized” status of the killers. Thus, Judge Michael Musmanno, 
who served at the successor trials at Nuremberg, wrote: 
How can one write about a planned and calculated killing of 
a human race? It is a concept so completely fantastic and so 
devoid of sense that one simply does not want to hear about 
it and is inclined to turn a deaf ear to such arrant nonsense. 
Barbarous tribes in the wilds of South Paciªc jungles have 
fallen upon other tribes and destroyed their every member; 
in America, Indian massacres have wiped out caravans and 
destroyed whole settlements and communities; but that an 
enlightened people in the 20th century should set out to ex-
terminate, one by one, another enlightened people, not in 
battle, not by frenzied mobbing, but by calculated gassing, 
burning, shooting, poisoning is simply blood-curdling ªc-
tion, ªt companion for H.G. Wells’ chimera on the invasion 
from Mars.53
In his opening statement in the same case (the Pohl case), prosecutor 
James McHaney argued: 
The systematic and relentless annihilation of the Jewish peo-
ple by the Nazis constitutes one of the blackest pages in the 
history of the civilized world. . . . One must search as far 
back as the massacres by Genghis Kahn and by Tamerlane to 
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ªnd anything remotely comparable to the extermination of 
the Jews by the Nazis.54
For McHaney, as for Musmanno, it was not genocide as such that was 
shocking, but rather that it had occurred in the “civilized world.” 
 There is an explicitly racial dimension to Musmanno’s and 
McHaney’s shock at European genocide. This is hardly surprising, 
given that America shared a patriarchal understanding of the civilizing 
mission of late Imperialism, as one can see in Theodore Roosevelt’s 
well-known remark that it was the United States’ obligation vis-à-vis the 
“weak and chaotic people south of us,” to “police these countries in the 
interest of order and civilization.”55 The leading role played by the 
United States in formulating the legalist paradigm of war after 1945 was 
hardly innocent of its own imperialist past.56 Musmanno’s shock is that 
of a colonizer forced to recognize in a society much like his own the 
behavior long attributed to the colonized. 
 As Catherine Hall has recently remarked, “The right to colonial 
rule was built on the gap between metropole and colony: civilization 
here, barbarism/savagery there.”57 Often, however, such dialectical en-
counters are understood in postcolonial studies as cultural encounters 
in lieu of military ones; as discursive, rather than coercive, engage-
ments.58 In a broad sense, of course, European cultural norms were 
central to the colonialist project, including its legal dimensions.  Yet 
while colonialism was indeed as much a cultural process as it was any-
thing else, in the context of the emergence of the legalist paradigm of 
war, it was the dialectics of colonial violence that was key.59
 Walter Bagehot asserted in 1869 that, like “the magical scent of 
the savage,” which he took to be indicative of their amazing physical 
prowess, their “persecuting tendency” likewise set them apart from 
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civilized nations.60 Colonial subjects were held to be particularly vio-
lent, especially prone to atrocities against non-combatants, great 
rapers of women and murderers of children, and to practice a mode 
of warfare that systematically refused to recognize the consensual lim-
its of “civilized” ªghting. 
 If Clausewitz had recognized that civilization provided only a lim-
ited and extrinsic check on the totalizing logic of violence, others, less 
intellectually honest than Clausewitz, projected any European ex-
cesses onto the colonial situation itself. Perhaps the most famous ex-
ample of this projection of imperial violence onto the colonial con-
text is Joseph Conrad’s Heart of Darkness, where it is Africa itself that 
strips away the veneer of civilization from Kurtz, such that he reverts 
to an atavistic savagery.61 Barbarism is something Kurtz learns in Af-
rica, not something he brings with him from Europe. 
 This projection of barbarism onto the colonial context can be 
seen, paradoxically, in much of the anti-imperialist rhetoric of Europe 
itself. For instance, at a meeting of the Queenstown Town Commis-
sioners in County Cork, Ireland, in 1879, one of the commissioners 
interrupted the proceedings to condemn the British conduct of the 
war in Zululand. He requested: 
[T]hat this board do express its utter abhorrence of the bru-
tal savagery practiced in the name of war upon the unfortu-
nate native tribes in South Africa by the British army . . . and 
whilst we look upon this war as altogether an unjustiªable 
one, we also most emphatically condemn the atrocious means 
adopted in carrying it on, for which there is scarcely a parallel 
to be found in the history of the darkest days of feudal barba-
rism.62
 Two points must be made with regard to this anti-imperialist 
condemnation of barbaric colonial war. The ªrst is that it was by no 
means a universal attitude among Europeans. In the same meeting in 
Queenstown, another commissioner took the occasion to remark that 
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“those Zulus deserved what they got.”63 More generally, there was a 
refusal even to acknowledge the possibility of European atrocities in 
the colonies. Sir Constantine Phipps said of King Leopold’s Congo 
Free State that he could not believe “that Belgians, members of a cul-
tivated people amongst whom I lived could, under even a tropical sky, 
have perpetrated acts of reªned cruelty.”64
 Second, and more important, was the sense clearly implied in 
Phipps’s statement that if Europeans practiced barbaric tactics in co-
lonial warfare, they did so only in response to the exigencies imposed 
upon them by the barbarians they were ªghting. Britain’s leading 
theoretician of colonial war, Colonel C. E. Callwell, remarked that 
“uncivilized races attribute leniency to timidity. A system adapted to 
[the suppression of the French rebellion in] La Vendée is out of place 
among fanatics and savages, who must be thoroughly brought to book 
and cowed or they will rise again.”65 To this he added that, in what he 
termed “small wars,” “operations are sometimes limited to committing 
havoc which the laws of regular warfare do not sanction.”66
 The French had ªrst perfected the art of barbaric warfare against 
barbarians in their invasion of Algeria in the 1840s, practicing razzia, 
or raid, against the indigenous economic infrastructure as a means of 
literally starving the people into submission. “We must forget those 
orchestrated and dramatic battles that civilized peoples ªght against 
one another. . .and realize that unconventional tactics are the soul of 
this war,” proclaimed General Thomas Bugeaud, the commander of 
French forces in Algeria.67 The French general Castellane justiªed 
this unconventional economic war by explaining: 
In Europe, once [you are] master of two or three large cities 
the entire country is yours[,] . . . but in Africa, how do you 
act against a population whose only link with the land is the 
pegs of their tents? The only way is to take the grain which 
feeds them, the ºocks which clothe them. For this reason, we 
make war on silos, war on cattle, the razzia.68
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This, of course, is a euphemistic way of saying that the French in Alge-
ria made war on civilians and, simultaneously, of justifying it. In effect 
then, if Europeans behaved like barbarians in the colonies, it was be-
cause the barbarian circumstances forced them to do so. In short, the 
atrocities which ineluctably accompanied such unrestrained violence 
were projected as fantasies onto their victims; their barbarism caused 
our barbaric actions. Clearly, Conrad was not alone in seeking to pac-
ify barbarism by situating it elsewhere. Barbarism was a function of 
location, not of military violence as such, and consequently not some-
thing one needed to worry about in intra-European warfare. 
 The logical conclusion of this, which one can see in the so-called 
Martens clause to the preamble of the 1907 Hague Convention, was 
that in legally regulating intra-European war, a certain standard of 
civilized conduct could be presupposed. The Martens clause states: 
[U]ntil a more complete code of the laws of war has been is-
sued, the high contracting parties deem it expedient to de-
clare that, in cases not included in the Regulations adopted by 
them, the inhabitants and the belligerents remain under the 
protection and the rule of the principles of the law of nations, 
as they result from the usages established among civilized peo-
ples, from the laws of humanity, and the dictates of the public 
conscience.69
In effect then, much of the conduct of war within Europe was entrusted 
to customary international law, conceptualized speciªcally as the typical 
practices of “civilized” countries.70 Cultural norms were explicitly con-
sidered an adequate substitute for legal ones. Heinrich von Treitschke 
argued, in 1898, that “all noble nations” had recognized the need to 
regulate military violence through an international law of war: 
There is nothing in international law more beautiful, or show-
ing more unmistakably the continual progress of mankind, 
than a whole series of principles, grounded only upon univer-
salis consensus and yet as ªrmly established as those of the 
Common Law of any country . . . . the whole trend of political 
life has come into the open to such a degree that any gross 
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breach of international law immediately causes great irritation 
in every civilized country.71
Yet, Treitschke was careful to add: 
It is mere mockery, however, to apply these principles [of in-
ternational law] to warfare against savages. A Negro tribe must 
be punished by the burning of their villages, for it is the only 
kind of example which will avail. If the German Empire has 
abandoned this principle to-day it has done so out of disgrace-
ful weakness, and for no reasons of humanity or high respect 
for law.72
 The civilization consensus that under-girded the assumption that 
the laws of war between civilized states need not worry about state 
criminality and could trust states to police their own soldiers was already 
felt to be in crisis before World War I. The literature of cultural pessi-
mism in this period is enormous and much of it focuses on the pre-
sumed fragility of civilization.73 As early as 1892, J.G. Frazer ruminated: 
It is not our business here to consider what bearing the per-
manent existence of such a solid layer of savagery beneath the 
surface of society, and unaffected by the superªcial changes of 
religion and culture, has upon the future of humanity. The 
dispassionate observer, whose studies have led him to plumb 
its depths, can hardly regard it otherwise than as a standing 
menace to civilisation.74
Such worries were hardly the exclusive provenance of academic mys-
tics like Frazer (or, one might add, Oswald Spengler or Richard Wag-
ner). It was also a common theme in the popular literature of the day. 
In his 1913 potboiler, The Power-House, John Buchan’s arch-villain An-
drew Lumley taunts the hero, Sir Edward Leithen, barrister and Tory 
MP, for defending the principles of civilization: 
That is the lawyer’s view, but, believe me, you are wrong. Re-
ºect, and you will ªnd that the foundations are sand. You 
think that a wall as solid as the earth separates civilization 
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from barbarism. I tell you the division is a thread, a sheet of 
glass. A touch here, a push there, and you bring back the 
reign of Saturn.75
To Buchan’s Andrew Lumly, one could, of course, add Sax Romer’s Fu 
Manchu, H. Rider Haggard’s She, and a host of other master criminals 
and exotic savages of the late nineteen and early twentieth centuries, all 
threatening the complacent civilization of adolescent readers across 
Europe. 
B. Europeanization of Colonial Violence 
 It was the experience of what Raymond Aron called Europe’s sec-
ond thirty years’ war, that is, of two total wars within the space of a gen-
eration from 1914 to 1945, that brought home to Europeans the les-
sons they had hitherto been unwilling to learn from their own conduct 
of colonial wars around the world: that the modern nation-state was 
capable of brutality and a callus disregard for elementary rights on a 
previously unimagined scale.76 Whether the Herero, the Tasmanians, 
or the Native Americans were the victims, Europeans and their descen-
dants had been practicing genocide long before there was a word to 
describe it.77 The breakthrough to the legalist paradigm came not, as 
one might expect, from the experience of genocide but from total 
war.78 Total war, as conceptualized, if not consistently practiced by Na-
poleon, and perfected in colonial war, became the dominant experi-
ence of two generations of Europeans. Total war had two related di-
mensions: ªrst, the application of gross, asymmetrical violence, and 
second, the waging of war not only, or even mainly, against a contend-
ing military force but against its constituent society.79 Total war was 
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simply the razzia writ large—and as such, was ineluctably linked to 
atrocity.80
 World War I began to Europeanize this form of colonial violence.81 
It was marked, as was colonial war, by asymmetrical violence, only here 
it was reciprocal asymmetrical violence. This somewhat paradoxical 
formulation must be understood precisely. From the perspective of the 
individual combatant, the violence was asymmetrical. As Ernst Jünger 
remarked of his ªrst experience of combat in World War I, “[i]t was 
quite unlike what I had expected. I had taken part in a major engage-
ment, without having clapped my eyes on a single living opponent.”82 
Artillery was responsible for roughly seventy percent of the wounds in-
ºicted in World War I.83 In set piece battles, machine guns inºicted the 
greatest number of fatal wounds and were highly valued by military 
planners precisely because of their machine-like character, with ªxed 
ªring arcs and ªxed rates of ªre that deliberately reduced the gunner 
to an adjunct operator who did little more than feed the automatic 
beast.84 Thus, for the average soldier in World War I, dying, rather than 
killing, became the core experience.85 Soldiers became objects, not 
subjects, of violence. If for the individual violence was asymmetrical, for 
the contending forces as a whole, it was reciprocal, each all too capable 
of inºicting similar casualties on the other; hence the stalemate of the 
western front and the shift from a war of maneuver to a war of attrition, 
or what the Germans tellingly called a Materielschlact, a battle of mate-
riel. The failure of the Leipzig trials for German war crimes in 1923 can 
thus be interpreted in part as the failure of the legal language of agency 
to comprehend the transformation of soldiers from agents into victims, 
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quite literally into materiel, and in the process rendering them cultur-
ally into martyrs on the altar of civilization.86
 The Fascist response to World War I can be interpreted in part as 
an attempt to restore agency in the wake of its violent destruction in 
the war, but agency conceptualized for a new era, an anti-liberal, anti-
individualist collective agency; agency as historical destiny, agency as 
the voice of the dead.87 If World War I put Europeans into the mili-
tary situation of savages, World War II put them into the social situa-
tion of savages. World War II was no longer about blurring the distinc-
tions between soldier and civilian, between agent and victim, between 
subject and object, but about their obliteration. The generality of this 
situation hid the speciªcity of the Holocaust from most observers un-
til well after the War; hence Nuremberg’s concentration on military 
violence as the crux of the crisis of civilization in the face of civilized 
barbarism. Like fascism, but from the radically distinct framework of 
liberal legalism, it was an attempt to restore agency to a situation that 
threatened the very conditions of its possibility, primarily by trying to 
outlaw total war itself since it was rightly feared that total war could 
not be waged without barbarism.88
Conclusion 
 It was less the unprecedented character than the massive scale of 
Nazi barbarism that was decisive for the emergence of the legalist 
paradigm, allowing an implementation of ideas and doctrines that 
had begun to develop as early as Grotius, but had hitherto been un-
able to overcome the resistance posed by the institution of national 
sovereignty. The two key pillars of the legalist paradigm—the discon-
nection of rights from sovereignty and the doctrine of mutual state 
and individual criminality—emerged as a response to the realization, 
driven home by the experience of the mass destruction and atrocity 
perpetrated by nation-states in the course of global war, that sovereign 
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nation-states alone were not simply insufªcient guarantors of the basic 
rights associated with “civilization,” but that they could often be their 
worst violators. 
 It was this experience that was foremost in the minds of many at 
Nuremberg, lead prosecutor Justice Robert H. Jackson ªrst among 
them. On July 26, 1946, responding to charges by the defense that the 
trial violated the prohibition against ex post facto law through its retroac-
tive authorization under new international statutes (the London Char-
ter), Jackson justiªed this novelty by noting that far from: 
standing at the apex of civilization . . . in the long perspec-
tive of history the present century will not hold an admirable 
position, unless its second half is to redeem its ªrst. . . . If we 
cannot eliminate the causes and prevent the repetition of 
these barbaric events, it is not an irresponsible prophecy to 
say that this twentieth century may yet succeed in bringing 
the doom of civilization.89
According to Jackson, the London Charter, which he had helped draft, 
merely recorded the state of international law. Even if it marked a new 
advance, it was roughly parallel to the “evolution of local law when men 
ceased to punish crime by ‘hue and cry’ and began to let reason and 
inquiry govern punishment.”90 Law, as embodied reason, and thus as a 
marker of civilization and progress, offered the opportunity for the 
second half of the twentieth century to redeem the ªrst, to use law to 
bring the principles of international order into line with those of civili-
zation.91 The failure to do so, Jackson noted with an apocalyptic tone 
entirely in keeping with the times, might well mean the permanent end 
of civilization itself. The legalist paradigm of war thus emerged as a 
mode of redemption, a bulwark against apocalypse, as little less than an 
eschatological last-chance gamble on the durability of civilization in the 
face of its own undeniable barbaric tendencies. 
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